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I got the Ollie No-orth 
Bob Bo-ork 
Bye, Bye, Bye Centennial Blues 
57 
But if the advocate and the judge know their jobs, what is the 
constitutional scholar's role to be? In ideal terms, at least in the 
ideal terms of my distinguished colleague, I suspect that the scholar 
is seen as the only actor in the drama with the luxury of true neu-
trality. His or her role is thus that of the nagging conscience, to be 
everything the judge is supposed to be in myth but can never be in 
practice. If the legal system is to be kept honest the scholar must be 
honest, and to be honest the scholar must be ruthlessly disciplined. 
But if constitutional scholarship is not to be advocacy, what is 
it to be? If one cares deeply about the central issues of American 
life, and if one recognizes that judicial rulings in constitutional cases 
profoundly affect that life, what is the constitutional scholar to do? 
The advocate at least has a provisional anchor in the end he or 
she seeks to accomplish, and the judge an anchor in the end that is 
accomplished. The neutral scholar, however, must search for safe 
moorings in some more transcendent fixture. But where? In logic? 
In the constitutional text? In history? In the collective aspirations 
of the people? Where am I supposed to find my discipline? What 
discipline tells me what discipline means? To give up instrumental-
ism seems to threaten the one sure compass I have, what I feel in 
my gut. Without it will scholarship be drained of force and mean-
ing? Will I be yet another yuppie without a cause? 
I got the Ed Meese, Warren Burger, Roscoe Pound, 
Alexander Bickel, Gerald Gunther, 
Larry Tribe, Fred Rodell, John Nowak, Ron Rotunda, 
Mark Tushnet, Richard Posner, Vincent Blasi, 
Henry Monaghan, Michael Perry, William Van Alstyne, 
Dan Farber, David Bryden, Jesse Choper, John Hart Ely, 
Bruce Ackerman, Richard Epstein, Ronald Dworkin, 
John Rawls. Abe Lincoln. Herbert Wechsler, 
Orval Faubus, Teddy Kennedy, Orrin Hatch. 
James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, William Rehnquist, 
William Brennan, George Washington, Ronald Reagan 
Ollie No-orth 
Bob Bo-ork 
Bye, Bye, Bye Centennial Blues! 
DAVID M. O'BRIENzs 
Two points about contemporary constitutional scholarship 
strike me as worth making. First, it has become heavily normative 
28. Professor of History, University of Virginia. 
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as well as marked by the proliferation of specialized theories of judi-
cial review. As a result, we now face a kind of intellectual crisis. 
Second, I find surprisingly lacking a certain kind of empirical schol-
arship, namely, that focusing on collegial courts and how the inter-
action-the political interaction-of Justices and judges determines 
the course of adjudication and the direction of constitutional law. 
As to the first point: obviously, American Legal Realism's tri-
umph over Legal Formalism prepared the way for the development 
of contemporary instrumentalist or result-oriented jurisprudence. 
It did so by underscoring the significance of Justice Felix Frank-
furter's observation that constitutional law "is not at all a science, 
but applied politics." Karl Llewellyn, in particular, brought the in-
sights claimed by legal realism to bear on constitutional interpreta-
tion when in 1934 he called for a jurisprudence of a "living 
Constitution"-one, as he put it, "that can face fact, including that 
fact, is what we need." 
Since World War II, we have gotten more than Llewellyn, and 
others, perhaps, bargained for. As the Supreme Court expanded 
and espoused new constitutional doctrines and rights, liberal legal 
academics churned out more and more specialized theories of con-
stitutional interpretation. That appeared necessary not merely to 
justify novel rulings, but to explain prior holdings and to offer 
guidelines for later decisions, other courts, and legal development. 
There were (and are) scholars wedded to one or another ver-
sion of "interpretivism." This is particularly so for those trained at 
the time when progressives attacked the conservative judicial activ-
ism that marched under the banner of Legal Formalism and who 
favored the New Deal but found subsequent liberal judicial activism 
deeply troubling. They still insist on "the reasoned elaboration of 
judicial decisions" and decisions based on "neutral principles." But 
some in that and the next generation, following Justice Stone's sug-
gestion in footnote four of Carolene Products, also worked and re-
worked "process-oriented" theories of judicial review. 
It was with the generations that came of age in the late 1950s, 
1960s and early 1970s that liberal legal scholars emerged with even 
more explicitly "noninterpretivist" theories. Accordingly, constitu-
tional interpretation turned toward "abstract beliefs about morality 
and justice," the teachings of natural law and human dignity, the 
"voice of reason," "a moral patrimony" implicitly in "our common 
heritage," "the circumstances and values of the present generation," 
"conventional morality," "public morality," "constitutional moral-
ity," "fundamental values," the "essential principles of justice," and 
even the idea of progress. 
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Alongside this dominant current of legal scholarship came not 
only the Law and Economics School, but two other major intellec-
tual forces. They have now so taken hold that they are likely to 
prove major contenders in charting the course for scholarly debate 
during the rest of this century. 
Those identified with the Critical Legal Studies movement, on 
the one hand, sharply debunk the increasingly idiosyncratic theories 
of liberal legal scholarship. But beyond further broadening the 
scope of legal scholarship (much as did the "Law and Society" 
movement in the late 1960s and 1970s), this brand of scholarship 
threatens to go deeper into theories of literary criticism and social 
forces. 
Liberal legalism confronts another, even greater challenge 
from conservative legal scholars pushing a New Formalism. This 
movement grew out of opposition to the "liberal jurisprudence" of 
the Warren Court and the idea of a "living Constitution." And it 
has moved far beyond Richard Nixon's clarion call for "strict con-
structionists." Already widely popularized and identified with At-
torney General Edwin Meese's 1985 call for a "return to a 
jurisprudence of original intentions," it undeniably has a stronghold 
in law schools, with groups like the Federalist Society. And it has 
an even stronger hold in the federal judiciary. While the likes of 
Judge Robert H. Bork see themselves in the vanguard of this "great 
intellectual struggle," the changing character of the entire federal 
judiciary-due to President Ronald Reagan's naming of forty-five 
to fifty percent of the bench before leaving the Oval Office-will 
certainly affect the course of legal scholarship. 
Law reviews already bear the weight of the growing debate 
over a "jurisprudence of original intentions" and the New Legal 
Formalism. Yet, just as agreement on increasingly abstract princi-
ples of liberal legalism proved elusive, the New Legal Formalism 
and work-product of "originalist" judges, while providing much 
grist for legal scholars, is likely to prove no less divisive. Nor is the 
New Formalism any less normative than that of post-New Deal lib-
eral legalism or the Old Legal Formalism that preceded it. 
As for contemporary empirical research on collegial courts-
which was at the heart of public law scholarship (at least among 
political scientists since the pioneering work of C. Herman Pritch-
ett)-! am struck by the fact that it has gone in two directions. 
There are notable quantitative studies of voting alignments, the 
influence of and strategies for building voting blocs, and related 
levels of agreement or disagreement in deciding cases and opinion 
writing. Much of this research-incorporated now in law schools 
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and reviews-has been directed at the Supreme Court, though there 
have been some studies of lower federal appellate courts and state 
supreme courts. 
Unfortunately, most of this work is big on showing associa-
tional patterns and comparisons, but weak on detailed descriptions 
and analysis of collegial interaction. In short, much more than 
quantitative study of published opinions and docket books is 
needed. 
The kind of rich detail that we need on collegial interaction is 
the promise of the second line of literature geared toward more eth-
nographic, even journalistic, description. It is exemplified by the 
works of Alpheus T. Mason and Carl Swisher. One also thinks of 
the many recent biographies of Justices Louis Brandeis, Felix 
Frankfurter, and Frank Murphy, for example, or those of Judge 
Frank Johnson and Learned Hand. The shortcoming of these 
works is that the focus on individual judges-and their styles, ap-
proaches, and working relationships-often neglects collegial inter-
action. They nevertheless point toward a richer understanding of 
courts, judges, and politics. 
One exception in the domain of judicial biographies is Bernard 
Schwartz's major work on the Warren Court, Super Chief Earl 
Warren and His Supreme Court-A Judicial Biography. But alas 
even this vividly descriptive book offers little in terms of advancing 
conceptual understanding of collegial judicial decision making. And 
it invariably fails to incorporate the concerns and discoveries of 
those engaged in quantitative social science research. 
All of this is by way of indicating that I think there is a surpris-
ing dearth of what I call-in expropriating John Schmidhauser's 
words-"collective judicial biographies." That is to say, biographi-
cal studies whose chief concern is to explain the interpersonal rela-
tionships and interactions within collegial courts and which do so 
by combining both quantitative description and detailed discussion 
of intimate interactions, forces, and negotiations. 
In other words, the two lines of empirical judicial studies need 
to be brought together so that we begin to develop a comparative 
literature of collective judicial biographies. That literature would 
go beyond studies of the Supreme Court at different periods-
marked by different kinds of collegial interaction-to those of lower 
federal appellate courts and state supreme courts, as well as perhaps 
collegial courts abroad. 
Such studies of "court-ways" would not only advance our un-
derstanding of collegial decisionmaking. They could also offer some 
important findings for how we should think about courts and about 
1988] SYMPOSIUM 61 
possible, perhaps inexorable, changes in the structure of courts. 
Specifically, studies of court-ways need to pay more attention to the 
following: 
1. The effects of the size of an appellate bench and how the 
number and rotation of judges affect law and decisionmaking. 
2. The housing and geographical location of appellate courts 
as related to collegial interaction. One thinks, for example, of the 
differences between the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and that for 
the District of Columbia Circuit and how important those differ-
ences are for collegial decisionmaking. 
3. The rise of what some judges lament as "bureaucratic 
justice" -how the increase in the number of law clerks and staff 
attorneys affects collegial decisionmaking, the traditional role of ne-
gotiation and compromise, and opinion writing. 
4. Finally, a related issue, the consequences of introducing 
modern office managerial practices and equipment during the last 
ten to fifteen years. How are "court ways" changing due to the 
greater reliance on modern office technology? 
From my perspective as a political scientist, such empirical re-
search deserves as much (if not more) attention as that presently 
given to normative debates over theories of judicial review. 
JOHN H. GARVEY29 
1. It used to be that big shot legal academics wrote casebooks 
and treatises when they tired of writing for the law reviews. They 
now do books for university presses. There are many reasons for 
this. Treatises are out of fashion because there is too much law and 
it has lost its structure. Scholars are interested in either "decon-
structing" or "rethinking" the law. Neither of these enterprises ap-
peals to law firms, which buy a large fraction of the law reviews. 
Such writers are also often big thinkers (like treatise writers in their 
own way) and their oeuvre is too big for periodicals. Too, footnotes 
are less important for deconstructors and rethinkers, and the law 
reviews' addiction to them is annoying. (For shorter pieces such 
people flee to Constitutional Commentary, Ethics, Nomos, Philoso-
phy and Public Affairs, Social Philosophy & Policy, etc., where cita-
tion obligations are more relaxed.) 
I have several reflections about this change in the form of 
scholarship. One is that these books are hard for law library pa-
trons to find. If I'm doing research on judicial review or equal pro-
tection I can't find books on the subject through the Index to Legal 
29. Wendell Cherry Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. 
